New guidelines for determining corporate penalties in international corruption cases

The guidelines, which are based on Sections 27 and 28 of the Penal Code, came into force on 12 June 2026 and were drawn up under a mandate from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security as a follow-up to recommendations from the OECD. The aim is to provide guidance to the prosecution authorities when deciding to impose a corporate penalty in OECD corruption cases and to lay the foundations for more consistent practice. In addition, the guidelines will provide the business sector with greater predictability regarding the level of penalties and strengthen the incentives to prevent corruption through structured compliance work, self-reporting and active cooperation with the authorities.

Although the guidelines primarily apply to OECD corruption cases, the discussion of self-reporting and other contributions to the investigation may also provide guidance in other serious cases involving economic and environmental crime.

Imposition of corporate penalties 

Corporate liability is discretionary under Sections 27 and 28 of the Norwegian Penal Code. A penalty is not imposed automatically even if the conditions are met. The decision depends on an overall assessment, including the seriousness of the offence and whether the company could have prevented it through better controls, guidelines or training. 

Økokrim’s guidelines clarify the statutory factors set out in Section 28 and increase the level of corporate penalties in cases where the company has failed in its prevention efforts and corruption nevertheless occurs.

Penalty calculation based on fixed rates

The guidelines provide instructions on standardised methods for determining the amount of fines for bribes paid to foreign public officials.

• As a general rule, the fine should amount to between 200 and 400 per cent of the expected profit from the bribe (the primary method).
• Where the expected profit cannot be determined, the fine should amount to at least 400–800 per cent of the bribe amount. A bribe of 10 million Norwegian kroner would then result in a fine of 40–80 million kroner, before any mitigating or aggravating factors are taken into account.
• The fine may also be set at between 5 and 10 per cent of the undertaking’s turnover. Where the company is part of a corporate group, the group’s turnover may be taken as a basis, depending on the circumstances. This calculation is intended to ensure proportionality when applying the other two calculation methods. 

In our view, there are several fundamental concerns regarding this setting of a starting point for the level of fines. Several consultation bodies pointed out that the guidelines lack a sufficient legal basis, partly because there is little relevant case law. In the guidelines, Økokrim acknowledges that there is little precedent for fines in the types of cases covered by the OECD Convention, and that, against this background, the guidelines will aim in particular to provide guidance on the level of fines. However, it is the legislature’s task to set the framework for sentencing, and the appropriate level of sanctions must be determined by the courts. The prosecution authorities cannot use the guidelines to establish a level of punishment that lacks sufficient basis in Norwegian legal sources. The level of fines set out in the guidelines is also significantly out of proportion to the level of corporate penalties in other serious criminal cases. 

It remains to be seen, however, what weight the courts may give to the guidelines. As the Norwegian Bar Association emphasised during the consultation process, guidelines drawn up by the prosecution service – without a sufficient basis in more authoritative sources of law – will carry limited weight as a source of law. 

The importance of cooperation and self-reporting 

Companies that self-report and actively contribute to the investigation and prevention of offences may achieve a significant reduction in penalties. In exceptional cases, Økokrim may refrain from imposing corporate penalties altogether, provided that the company demonstrates ‘genuine efforts’ to prevent corruption. Particularly relevant factors are:

• Self-reporting – up to a 50 per cent reduction in penalties, provided that (i) the report is made before the police have had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the matter themselves, (ii) within a reasonable time after the company became aware of the offence, and (iii) the company discloses all relevant facts, including details of the individuals involved.
• Admission of guilt – up to a one-third reduction in penalties. This requires that the undertaking acknowledges all factual circumstances necessary for the act to be regarded as corruption, and that the undertaking could have prevented it.
• Contribution to the investigation of other offences – including information that may result in personal criminal liability for directors and employees. Withholding such information is regarded by Økokrim as a failure to cooperate fully.
• Access to information and documentation – up to a 30 per cent reduction in the penalty. The company may assist in the investigation by providing the police with access to information and documentation that the police would otherwise have difficulty obtaining, for example from a foreign subsidiary.
• Clarification of the extent and location of the proceeds – information that facilitates confiscation is viewed favourably when determining the sentence.
• Subsequent preventive measures – up to a 10 per cent reduction in the penalty. Measures to prevent new incidents of corruption that demonstrate that the company has learnt from its mistakes. This reduces the risk of recurrence and will be viewed favourably.

The total reduction in the penalty is determined following a specific overall assessment and is not limited to 50 per cent in the case of self-reporting. 

Confiscation

In addition to a fine, the proceeds of corruption shall be confiscated in accordance with Section 67 of the Penal Code. These may typically include profits from contracts or licences awarded as a result of the bribes. Fines and confiscation are independent sanctions, and the total penalty must be proportionate, cf. Section 29, second paragraph, of the Penal Code.

Publication 

Fines imposed on undertakings in corruption cases must be published on Lovdata, together with the grounds for determining the sanction. Companies that accept a fine must expect that the fine and the basis for its calculation will be made public. 

Expectations regarding the company’s anti-corruption programme 

There are currently no statutory requirements regarding companies’ anti-corruption measures. However, international ‘best practice’, including ISO 37001:2016, the OECD’s and Transparency International’s guidelines, as well as the UK Bribery Act and the US FCPA with their associated guidelines, provide guidance on what the prosecution authorities will expect.

Økokrim points out that the guidelines are not intended to provide guidance on companies’ anti-corruption measures, and acknowledges that there must be considerable flexibility regarding how companies design and implement anti-corruption programmes. However, the guidelines list a number of specific anti-corruption measures which they consider would typically be relevant, and they acknowledge that the sources mentioned above may be regarded as ‘best practice’.

Implications for Norwegian companies 

Økokrim’s new guidelines send a clear signal that preventive compliance work is an important prerequisite for favourable treatment. Økokrim’s guidelines emphasise that the provision in Section 28(c) of the Penal Code regarding whether the undertaking ‘could have prevented’ the offence through ‘guidelines, instructions, training, monitoring or other measures’ will be of great significance for the assessment of culpability and, consequently, the determination of the corporate fine. A failure to implement preventive measures in areas of particular risk is considered an aggravating factor; conversely, documented and effective anti-corruption measures may lead to a reduction in the penalty. 

The guidelines provide Norwegian companies with a clear incentive to review and strengthen their anti-corruption compliance programmes. This review should take into account the measures mentioned in Økokrim’s guidelines. We would also like to emphasise the following in particular:

• Anti-corruption measures must always be proportionate to the size, sector and risk exposure of the business.
• Ensure that corruption risk assessments are adequate, up to date and cover the entire organisation. For example, if the company has subsidiaries abroad, are relevant resources from these subsidiaries involved in the risk assessment process? Have sufficient information about the overseas operations been obtained? Have exposure related to the use of intermediaries and third parties in contractual relationships abroad been identified and managed?
• Actively monitor third parties, intermediaries (agents, consultants, facilitators, etc.) and joint ventures, including through robust third-party procedures and due diligence processes. According to the OECD, intermediaries and third parties are involved in the vast majority of corruption cases.
• It is not sufficient to have written procedures in place. The company must also document that the procedures have been implemented and are actually being followed in practice.
• Ensure that the company has internal channels and reporting procedures that can actually help to clarify breaches of the law, and a culture in which employees feel confident about coming forward. The potential discount of up to 50 per cent for self-reporting makes it economically rational for the company to detect and report breaches of the law before Økokrim does.
• Implement a contingency plan that sets out who does what if potential corruption is uncovered, and which should also address potential dialogue with the authorities. Økokrim specifically emphasizes that companies should have procedures in place for handling incidents or suspicions of corruption. 

If the company detects possible corruption, it should respond immediately and ensure proper handling throughout the entire process – from the moment the matter is detected until the case is closed. An early and structured response can have a significant impact on the corporate penalty.